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Abstract
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rise, or punish noncompliance. Throughout the years of China's rising, it has been accumulating
considerable hard power in its military and economic capabilities, while also trying to improve on its soft
power of cultural values. However one often overlooked, and under-appreciated power of China is the
integrative power of Chinese nationalism. This integrative power that comes from China’s acute usage of
nationalism to support the legitimacy of its one-party system. This study argues that China has an excess
of integrative power and that China has skillfully used it to turn unfavorable events and threats, such as
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A Weapon of Legitimacy: China’s Integrative Power and its Impact on its
Reactions to Domestic Conflicts
Kwok Chung Wong
On July 1, 1997, when Hong Kong was to be returned to China after 99 years of British
rule, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promised an unchanging 50 years of autonomy and
Hong Kong became the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China. Thirteen years prior to
reunification, Deng Xiaoping made remarks saying that the issue of Hong Kong was as difficult
as is the problem with Taiwan, which would require new means to solve new problems, yet “a
patriot is one who respects the Chinese nation, sincerely supports the motherland’s resumption of
sovereignty over Hong Kong and wishes not to impair Hong Kong's prosperity and stability”
(Deng, 1984, para. 8). Interestingly enough, to this day Taiwan has rejected the notion of one
country, two systems, that governs Hong Kong and refused to become part of China, with some
even calling for independence. On the other hand, Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997
under the Sino-British Joint Declaration that was signed in 1984, which effectively ended over
150 years of British rule over the peninsula. During the handover, despite being promised
autonomy by the CCP, HongKongers have been skeptical whether one country, two systems can
last the full 50 years.
It was the events of Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989 that worried the HongKongers
back then. The Tiananmen Incident made China lose the support of many members of
international community. Worried for what would become of Hong Kong after reunification,
many people back then in 1989 began scrambling for immigration fearing for the day of July 1,
1997 of Hong Kong’s handover. The New York Times back then stated that HongKongers are
“trapped between a looming Chinese motherland they cannot change and a departing imperial
motherland – Britain” (Scott, 1989, para. 7). It is important to note that Hong Kong did not enjoy
the benefits of a liberal democracy under British rule, though HongKongers back then would be
expecting China along with Hong Kong to become freer and more liberal as time passes.
Unfortunately, the promised 50 years of autonomy under the one country, two systems was met
with pessimism when HongKongers saw the tragic events of June 4 when a group of prodemocracy students was put down by lethal force under the command of the CCP (Blakemore,
2020).

This study focuses on answering the question of how China uses integrative power
containing its two pillars of legitimacy in nationalism and economics to punish noncompliance in
smaller domestic powers such as Hong Kong. Under this topic, the case of Hong Kong is seen as
a case of domestic noncompliance, when they do not act in the interest of the CCP party in
Beijing. The objective of this study is to determine how China reacts to domestic noncompliance,
as in the case of democratizing Hong Kong to challenge the CCP’s one-party rule in Beijing.
China’s handling of domestic conflicts deserves more attention by the international community,
especially since the CCP has begun to use other means of power, such as integrative power to
replace direct destructive power such as that of Tiananmen 30 years ago. The underlying
message behind CCP power, is to use any means necessary to maintain the legitimacy of the
party. Thus, this is a study that seeks to uncover a style of Beijing punishment that it may employ
when domestic actors, such as Hong Kong takes a move not in the party’s interest such as
demanding the CCP for more democracy.
Methodology
This study is a qualitative review of the current development of the protests, or riots as in
the CCP perspective, of Hong Kong, and based on this identify the means that the CCP employs
to punish domestic noncompliance. This will hopefully identify a trend where the CCP clearly
demonstrating that nationalism and economic power, the two pillars of Chinese legitimacy, are
integrative powers helping China justify its use of more robust and assertive means to punish
noncompliance domestically. The author believes it is important to understand what is at stake
for China and CCP leadership to behave in a way that preferences the use of integrative power to
shut down noncompliance.
Since this study will look at what has prompted the use of Chinese integrative power, a
historical review of how China or the CCP manages to gain that power and tries to maintain that
power is a prerequisite to further discussion. This will be followed by a literature review of
Kenneth Boulding’s (1990) book, Three Faces of Power, as this is the piece of literature that
would be most relevant to the discussion of this study and also supported by other scholars that
relate themselves to integrative power. This will attempt to show that China does not always rely
on its economic or military might to deal with domestic noncompliance; instead, they first look
to the integrative power of the Chinese race under the CCP and attempt to punish using
nationalism instead.

This method is not without its limitations. Since the main case study is a recent, ongoing conflict in Hong Kong, most articles related to the conflict will be news articles that could
potentially exhibit a certain amount of bias and subjectivity. In order to address this potential
distortion, media sources from both Hong Kong and Chinese state media will be used to provide
a broader perspective from all parties. This would also include Western media to incorporate
how the rest of the world view the circumstances from which protests arise. The US perspective
is important as they have also played a part in the emerging conflict.
By so doing, this study investigates mainly how the CCP justifies the use of violence
against protestors and how Hong Kong and the Mainland condemns each other for escalated
violence. Another problem in researching this topic is the sensitivity of the conflict in both the
Mainland and Hong Kong.
Sources utilized in the background and literature review include publications like
academic texts, journal articles and reliable media websites that address the matter of concern.
To understand China’s power, it is important to see where China gains its power in the first
place. Existing literature and theories such as the theory of hegemonic war and the China Threat
Theory should also be taken into consideration to show the rise of China is generally viewed in a
negative light in the West, where media outlets have been the most critical of China’s handling
of the protests in Hong Kong. This literature review on power should explain how scholars
identify different types of power. The author will attempt to identify the type of power from a
variety of different types of power that are most likely to compel China to use violence when its
core interests of one-party rule is threatened.
Finally, the reason that Hong Kong is chosen as the case to represent China’s integrative
power is because it is the most recent case that shows this power is in fact, being used rather
effectively, in putting down protests. This is seen in the case where Chinese citizens, at home
and abroad, rally behind China in support of it suppressing protests in Hong Kong despite the
somewhat questionable means used by the pro-Beijing Hong Kong government. The following
section examines how China has risen to power and what it has learned during this period.
The Trajectory of China’s Rise: Origins of Chinese Power
This section reviews the rise of China and discusses where China obtains its power in the
first place. This is important because later, one can see that the CCP’s integrative power of
nationalism and economics is derived from the process of the rise of China. Through its peaceful

rise—now revised into the Peaceful Development of China (Xinhua, 2018) because rise sounded
too assertive—has managed to accumulate considerable hard power in its economy and military
capabilities. This concerns some scholars in the West. Neorealist scholars such as John
Mearsheimer states that, under offensive realism, all states will try to achieve regional
hegemony, so that it is so strong in the region that no other state will ever think about
challenging it (Mearsheimer, 2001). As Mearsheimer’s China Threat Theory was gaining
momentum, the Chinese resisted it with counterarguments. Zheng Bijian (2005), a CCP advisor
to the former president Hu Jintao, argued in China’s Peaceful Rise to Great Power Status that
China will always be a developing country, seeking peaceful ways to gain resources, and not
challenge the US hegemony. Even so, people were skeptical of how long China could stay
peaceful and whether the so-called peaceful rise was just simple rhetoric for the CCP, buying
time to catch up with the rest of the world, while the Chinese economy was still on the rise.
In addition to the perceived military threat that international relations scholars warn of,
there are also more immediate potential economic threats coming from a strong China. For
example, Chinese goods from the textile industry are quickly displacing local goods in Latin
America (Jenkins & Barbosa, 2012). Critics have also accused China of unfair trade practices,
dumping, and exploiting gray areas of trade regulations around the world, with US President
Donald Trump being the primary figure assaulting the same trade practices (Hass, 2018).
Despite all of that, China’s rise on the international stage has been mostly peaceful in the
absence of war, but Buzan and Cox has said that this rise is cold because there is no mutual trust
between China and other powers like the US, and China may at times expand at the expense of
others (Buzan & Cox, 2017). Shambaugh (2013) adds that China is a lonely power, having no
real allies it can trust nor any allies that completely trust it, despite warm surface relations with
Russia, Pakistan and North Korea.
The main worry of the US and the West is where China is going to spend its hard power
accumulated in the rise. If there would be a reason for China to engage the US in a hegemonic
war, the reason could be as Robert Gilpin (1988) writes in the Theory of Hegemonic War, that
most wars happen not because of structural features of the international system, but the distrust
and uncertainty of the other side. Graham Allison (2017) draws the link between the China-US
hegemonic struggle to the Peloponnesian War where the rising power of Athens and the
hegemony of Sparta went to war against each other because Athens threatened a vital alliance

with Corinth that kept the Spartan homelands safe for centuries. This analogy is not unlike the
expansion of Chinese investments such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that has gained
momentum in Asia that could potentially disrupt traditional alliances in Asia, drawing former US
allies towards Beijing’s economic gravity. Allison (2017) adds that both China and the US must
make painful sacrifices to avoid a hegemonic war.
On the other hand, China’s endeavor in turning itself from the poorest country at the end
of the 1970s, to the second largest economy in the world today, is indeed impressive. Though,
there are also a few cracks in the seemingly impenetrable Chinese armor of materialistic
strength. China has problems with food security having sacrificed much of its fertile land in
exchange for rapid urbanization (Chen, 2007). Another problem China faces is its increasingly
imbalanced demographics where the male population greatly outnumbers females as an
aftermath of its One Child Policy established in the 1980s (Chen & Powell, 2012). For CCP and
policy makers in Beijing, the US encirclement has always been something to worry about as
China has attempted a wide variety of strategies to attempt to break free of encirclement such as
befriending Japan and punishing India (Garver & Wang, 2010), both US allies. China attempts to
use economic incentives such as the BRI for neighboring developing countries, creating a path
through these countries to break free of encirclement and gaining access to resources in the
Middle East and Africa.
That said, although the previous problems are headaches for the leaders in the CCP, they
do not directly endanger the party’s power or jeopardize its one-party rule. Food security and a
slowing economy would trouble the CCP in the long term, but China is already trying to remedy
this through diversifying its trade routes with the BRI. With this in mind, the discussion becomes
how China is going to deal with these cracks in the armor of its materialistic strength. The
Communist Party does this by rallying nationalism from the people. The next section looks more
specifically on how China has dealt with Hong Kong in the past.
Hong Kong’s Relationship with China
Hong Kong has always had a difficult time in managing its relationship with China. As
mentioned above, the Tiananmen Incident was a worrying sign for Hong Kong as China
violently crushed a movement for democracy. Although the 2019 protests were for democracy,
one must also remember that Hong Kong has never been a full democracy under British rule.
Democratic reforms only happened under the last appointed governor of Hong Kong, Chris

Patten, who claimed in an interview, that HongKongers were always good at being able to “get
things done” and “make a change” saying that he wanted electoral reforms to become a catalyst
of democratic change for China (Ibrahim, 2017). In another interview, Patten mentioned that
undermining Hong Kong’s rule of law will jeopardize its position as the financial center of the
world (Wintour, 2019), taking away one of the most prestigious symbols of pride for
HongKongers.
When these electoral reforms were introduced by Patten, the Basic Law served as the
guidelines of how Hong Kong should be governed by China after the handover. One of its lines
states the following:
The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual
situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the
principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief
Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating
committee in accordance with democratic procedures. (Full texts of the Constitution and
the Basic Law-chapter (4), 2017)
In the early years of handover, it appears that Hong Kong would be much more free than
mainland China, as CCP officials do not preside in Hong Kong; despite the considerable
amounts of influence that Beijing does exert (Albert, 2019). HongKongers became increasingly
concerned about the growing influence of the CCP as time passed, and very critical of the proBeijing government undermining Hong Kong’s autonomy by the protests of 2019.
The first record of large-scale protests post-unification was in 2003 (Research on Article
23, 2013). Smaller scale pro-democracy protests have occurred on an annual basis on July 1, the
anniversary of the Hong Kong handover, paying homage to the Tiananmen Incident (Bush,
2014), but none were nearly as big as the protests of 2003. These protests were prompted by the
government’s attempt to implement Article 23, which prohibits treason, sedition, subversion or
stealing state secrets of the Chinese government (Research on Article 23, 2013). For
HongKongers, Article 23 is an attack on the freedom of the domestic press in Hong Kong
making it difficult for the Hong Kong press to cover problems with the Mainland (Fu et al.,
2005).
The decade between 2003 and 2014 has been relatively quiet with no real large-scale
protests, but it is clear that during this period of relative quietness, Hong Kong’s autonomy was

being eroded at a fast pace. By 2014, elections only allowed HongKongers to vote for 2 or 3
candidates all from pro-Beijing business groups (Lahiri, 2019). Lai Tung-kwok (2014), from the
Hong Kong Security Bureau, warned that protestors must be aware of the consequences that
would arise from any action that would break the law, even if it is under the name of democracy
and freedom of speech. Yet, the consequences protestors faced in the Occupy Central movement
was a brutal police response with tear gas, dispersing crowds without achieving concrete results,
unlike the 2003 protests that resulted in the retraction of Article 23’s implementation.
That said, the story continues with the aftermath of this pro-democracy movement. Hong
Kong’s chief executive is elected by 1200-member Election Committee, and Carrie Lam won the
majority with 777 votes from the committee, defeating her runner up, John Tsang that was more
popular with the public by over twice the number of votes (Chung, 2017). Lam’s victory was
seen by the West as a clear erosion of Hong Kong’s democracy and autonomy. For example, US
Senator Marco Rubio and Representative Christopher Smith claims there is clear interference
from Beijing in Hong Kong’s elections, which former chief executive Leung defended the
elections with criticisms against pan-democrats that voted for Tsang instead of putting up their
own candidate (Ibid.). This being said, Lam was the preferred candidate of the CCP in Beijing.
Fast-forwarding to 2019, the current Hong Kong protests, in many ways, are a direct
sequel to the Umbrella Movement (BBC, 2019) that failed to achieve much five years ago,
triggered by the controversial Carrie Lam’s extradition bill. The first case that invoked the
extradition bill was when a Hong Kong man murdered his girlfriend in Taiwan (Sun, 2019, para.
6). The Hong Kong government justified that the extradition bill intends to close a legislative
loophole and prevent criminals from using Hong Kong as a safe haven to escape crimes. At the
same time this would also allow fugitives from the Mainland to be sent back to China where they
may not be fairly tried (Sun, 2019).
Like the Umbrella Movement, the 2019 protests started out peaceful but escalated in
violence as protesters clashed with the police and vandalized government properties. Like the
Umbrella Movement, the police attempted to disperse the protestors through the same means;
tear gas as protests started to escalate in violence. The problem with this, as later reported, was
that tear gas used against protestors may have cancer-causing chemicals extra harmful to
children, pregnant women and the elderly (Is Tear Gas in Hong Kong Making Polluted City a
Toxic Turn?, 2019). While the original intent of protestors in June was a withdrawal of the

extradition bill, Carrie Lam announcing its withdrawal in July was “too little, too late” according
to some critics (Pomfret & Jim, 2019). In response to police brutality, protestors have proposed
the Five Demands (Wong, 2019) as well. According to a report by a former officer at the Royal
Hong Kong Police Martin Purbrick (2019), the Yuen Long attacks on July 21 by men in white tshirts against protestors were local villagers and Hong Kong mafia gangs, which led to a
widespread belief that the Hong Kong police were collaborating with criminals that may have
connections to the mainland. When the Communist Party celebrated its 70th Anniversary of
Founding on October 1, 2019, an 18-year-old protestor was shot in the shoulder by the police
(2019-2020 Hong Kong Protests Timeline, 2020). Violence continued to escalate between June,
when the protests started, and November, when both civilians and police were using force
against each other.
Integrative Power of China and Hong Kong
To understand the nature of the conflict between China and Hong Kong one must
understand the different types of power operating behind the scenes. One explanation of power is
the physical, material or symbolic means that can make the adversary comply where otherwise
they would not (Etzioni, 1975). However, that alone would be insufficient to understand the
situation in Hong Kong, where China could have suppressed the 2019 protests by military means
as they did in Tiananmen Square three decades ago.
In 1989, economist Kenneth Boulding wrote an influential book on the topic of power. In
this book, Three Faces of Power, Boulding identifies three types of power that can be used to
understand conflicts: destructive; productive; and integrative (Boulding, 1990). Paying special
attention to integrative power, Boulding (1990) makes the following remarks: “Integrative power
may be thought of perhaps as an aspect of productive power that involves the capacity to build
organizations, to create families and groups, to inspire loyalty, to bind people together, to
develop legitimacy” (p.25). In other words, integrative power is the ability for people to bond
and relate to each other and create a sense of legitimacy for their belonging within a community.
Integrative power is a strong source of CCP power under Boulding’s definition. The CCP does
not solely rely on its perceived military or economic power, but also has a set of integrative
power that it prefers to use when dealing with domestic noncompliance such as Hong Kong. Of
course, while integrative power is most relevant to the discussion of the conflict in Hong Kong,
the other two faces of power, destructive and productive, also play an important role underneath

the CCP’s integrative power. For Boulding (1990), conflict arises when one side begins
increasing power at the expense of their adversary. For Hong Kong, integrative power is
definitely lost, along with its destructive and productive power, as the CCP increases their own,
the means of which will be explored in the following section.
Before going into further detail, a more comprehensive definition of integrative power is
needed, especially since Boulding never clearly defined what integrative power was. One of
Boulding’s definitions was love, but if love was too strong of a word then respect could be
another potential definition (Boulding, 1990). To clarify, Dugan (2003) says that since concepts
such as love, loyalty and respect are insufficient to explain large group behaviors, a more
accurate understanding of integrative power should be the sense of belonging to a certain group.
For example, in Black Power (1992), Hamilton and Ture say that empowering Black people was
not just about putting Black faces in office, but empowering their community, allowing them to
have their own goals and forming their own organizations.
Another definition of integrative power can be found in Hannah Arendt’s (1970) text, On
Violence. Arendt says that power is people’s ability to act together, which also means that
individuals do not hold power and a leader in power is only because that person is empowered by
others (Arendt, 1970). Arendt’s definition adds to our understanding of integrative power by
adding a cooperative element. Therefore, if we combine the above definitions, we can say that
integrative power is a type of legitimacy that empowers the leaders of governments, groups or
ethnicities, which in return forms a sense of community in a society, bonding people together
through concepts such as love and respect on the individual level. In addition, Boulding (1990)
mentions that economic power also has a certain amount of integrative power as well.
In the context of Hong Kong and its integrative power, it is not just about putting Hong
Kong citizens in office for them to act in Beijing’s interest. Instead, it should be allowing
HongKongers interested in working towards universal suffrage under the Basic Law, even if this
may not be in Beijing’s interests. This could potentially be the integrative power that creates
legitimacy in Hong Kong’s government that the people would be willing to empower through
love and respect. However, as Boulding (1990) said, each of the three faces of power has both a
positive and negative use, and in the case of integrative power, there is always the danger of it
being used to create enemies and alienate people. While not going as far as to marginalize
HongKongers or create enemies in Hong Kong, the CCP’s use of integrative power have signs of

gaining power at the expense of their adversary, in this case, Hong Kong. The CCP does so with
its two pillars of power that supports its legitimacy, and hence its integrative power. At the same
time, Hong Kong is losing integrative power with more people becoming less faithful in the
increasingly pro-Beijing government.
Two Pillars of Chinese Integrative Power
The CCP’s legitimacy is supported by its two pillars of economic power and nationalism.
The CCP maintains its one-party rule of China through the use of these two powers to maintain
legitimacy, and therefore their integrative power in China.
First of all, in terms of economic power, during the transition from the rule of Chairman
Mao to Deng, China has turned from a revolutionary state to a more pragmatic economic, and
development-focused, industrial state. Back in the late 70s, the CCP built its reputation on its
ability to bring continued prosperity to the people and economic development to China where
Deng realized that China cannot afford further chaos after a decade of turmoil (Baum, 1996).
Chu (2013) discovers that, contrary to Western beliefs that the CCP is losing support from
widespread protests and discontent across the country, the Party is incredibly effective in
responding to popular demands, steering policies towards economic development, and restoring
China’s influence on the global stage. Chu (2013) adds that a majority of Chinese people agree
that despite the faults of the CCP, it is still the best governing system for China. Therefore, one
aspect of the CCP’s legitimacy, one of the pillars of its integrative power, is based on its
economic might. One of China’s state media, the China Global Television Network (CGTN) has
reported that the Xi Jinping mentioned the phrase meihaoshenghuo, which is translated into
“better life” or “happy life” a total of 14 times in the opening and closing paragraph of the 19th
Party Congress (Opening session of 19th CPC National Congress, 2017) though Xi has
introduced several sweeping reforms in the party after his inauguration as President and made the
Chinese economic pillar a lot more brittle than it appears. Elizabeth Economy (2019) says that
despite the strong improvements China has made in recent years, there are certain factors
including too much party control of economic affairs, and the Trump administration’s tariffs
from the trade war, that have stagnated the Chinese economy. As a result, this forces the CCP to
find new resolutions for its stagnating economy.
The second, much stronger pillar of Chinese integrative power is nationalism, seeming to
even subordinate the economic pillar. The CCP is very effective at building, and actively rallies,

nationalism for the people to support their one-party rule (Holbig & Gilley, 2010), even
especially effective when attempting to suppress movements that are against party ideals, such as
the Hong Kong protests.
The origins of Chinese nationalism can be traced back to the May 4th Movement in 1919,
this student uprising against imperialism is still widely celebrated today by the CCP today
(Buckley & Qin, 2019). While both the May 4th movement and Tiananmen Incident on June 4th
were student movements, May 4th of 1919 is commemorated in China while June 4th of 1989 is a
heavily censored topic. On May 4th of 1919, university students marched into Tiananmen Square
to protest against the unfair ruling of the Treaty of Versailles (Babones, 2019). Despite the fact
that China was on the side of the 32 victorious nations of the First World War, the Treaty of
Versailles was in favor of Japan occupying the Shandong province (Qingdao) after German
retreat, instead of returning it to China (Babones, 2019). This carries a grim reminder for the
Chinese of its position within international society at the time and reminds them of the many
unequal treaties the Qing dynasty was forced to sign.
On September 21, 1949, at the dawn of the People’s Republic of China, Chairman Mao
gave a lengthy speech about how the “Chinese have stood up” from national humiliation (Mao,
1949). In 2019, President Xi commemorated the 100th anniversary of May 4th and said that the
movement was an anti-imperialistic and patriotic campaign to encourage the Chinese youth of
today to study the spirit of May 4th and devote themselves to the Chinese dream (Xinhua, 2019c);
2019 also commemorates the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. Youths under
Chinese patriotic education are constantly reminded of China’s sufferings under Western
imperialism and are encouraged to teach them to the next generation (Callahan, 2004).
Other than textbooks for youths, the CCP also has acute control over the media. Susan
Shirk (2007) in her book China: Fragile Superpower, says that the Propaganda Department in
the party is sacred and that they have been trying to bolster the CCP’s legitimacy and promote
nationalism ever since they were put in charge of the patriotic education campaign (p.84). In
China, stories about Japan, Taiwan and the US sell and “national myths” are reinforced by
propaganda (p.85). For example, in 2012, when Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintaro announced
that the Tokyo Metropolitan government would purchase the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
(Ishihara Seeking to Buy Senkaku Islands, 2012), it agitated a wide group of Chinese as they
targeted Japanese shopping malls and vandalized Japanese products to protest against Japan.

Looking towards Hong Kong, there is evidence that Chinese nationalism is used to attack
Hong Kong and its protestors as well. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of
China spokeswoman, Hua Chunying (2019), began blaming the US for the conflict in China
when China sanctioned American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), saying that these
NGOs trying to support the Hong Kong protests are to blame for the chaos in Hong Kong and
sanctions on them are “rightly imposed.” Likewise, China’s state media, Xinhua (2019a) also
made a similar remark when it condemned the US House bill, Hong Kong Human Rights and
Democracy Act, saying that the US is attempting to contain the development of China with the
“Hong Kong card.” The way that the Chinese propaganda machine is manipulating the public
opinion in the case of Hong Kong is when state media begin calling protestors, rioters, and
framing these people as “radicals” and “thugs” (Kuo, 2019a). As stories related to the US—
hence foreign intervention—sells in China, the CCP’s propaganda machine effectively
manipulates the public opinions of the Chinese to be against the Hong Kong protests.
Recall once again, Boulding (1990) says that conflict can arise when two or more parties
see changes in the power of one that will benefit or increase their welfare at the expense of
another. The case of Hong Kong trying to become more democratic is an act of defiance against
Beijing’s one-party rule, as allowing Hong Kong to become more democratic would mean China
is no longer under one-party rule, despite being promised two systems, one country. An act
against the CCP’s power within one-party rule would prompt a violent response from the Party
in Beijing. The CCP will attempt to defend themselves through the use of their integrative
power, like nationalism, to prevent their loss of power. This in turn diminishes the potential
integrative power of Hong Kong and Hong Kong sees Beijing eroding its autonomy prompting a
violent grassroots response.
Decline of Hong Kong’s Integrative Power
Hong Kong has lost integrative power through constant attacks on its autonomy by the
CCP. While the CCP can enhance its integrative power in dealing with Hong Kong through
nationalism, the integrative power of Hong Kong is diminishing at a rapid pace. This has also
caused Hong Kong to view CCP erosion as more and more of a threat.
Early evidence of this loss of Hong Kong integrative power is seen in Lo Shiu-hing’s
(2001) book Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, Communication and Political Decay. In this,
Lo argues that Hong Kong’s political decay is a serious issue now that Hong Kong is taking on a

much more personal style of governance, a “chaotic implementation of public politics,” and
insensitivity of the government to public opinions (p.13). A succession of protests has occurred
since Lo’s book published in 2001. First were the large-scale protests in 2003 against the
implementation of Article 23, then Umbrella Movement of 2014, and now the protests against
the extradition law in 2019. These show that HongKongers have constantly been aware of the
erosion of their political autonomy by the CCP’s encroachment into Hong Kong.
Further evidence of this decay can be seen in how the police treated protestors and
reporters alike during the protests. The Hong Kong police’s brutality soon became a widely
known fact across the globe. In a letter, the South China Morning Post attempts to explain police
brutality with Sigmund Freud’s three parts of the mind theory, saying that Hong Kong police’s
riot gear conceals their identity and empowers them to act in a way that they will not be held
accountable afterwards (Ieong, 2019). Police brutality in itself is insufficient to erode
HongKonger’s faith in the government. The problem was when Carrie Lam defended police
brutality as an “appropriate force of weapon” (Chan & Ko, 2019). Retired police senior
superintendent Henry Ho said that Hong Kong was one of the safest cities in the world because it
had the best police (McCarthy, 2019). This faith has been betrayed by the brutality of police and
the pro-Beijing government that endorses such action. To make matters worse, Lam has rejected
an independent inquiry into police brutality, saying that there is no need to subject the Hong
Kong police that works day and night against “criminal offenses” to such charges (Reid, 2020).
This shows an active attempt from Lam’s pro-Beijing administration to defend the police,
reinforcing the fact that the police were able to act without consequences against protestors and
reporters alike.
Covering the protests in Hong Kong was not difficult for the CCP propaganda machine.
While initially the Hong Kong protests received little Mainland media attention, the state media
quickly began to denounce protestors as rioters as soon as they tarnished the Chinese flag and
vandalized the national emblem (Xinhua, 2019b). The vandalizing of the Chinese national
emblem is actually symbolic for the HongKongers who wish to gain more autonomy, and
distance themselves from the grips of the CCP. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also made
sharp comments against central figures of the protests. For example, spokesman Geng Shuang
said student leader Joshua Wong (a central figure in both the Umbrella Movement in 2014 and
2019 Protests) had evil plots for Hong Kong independence and that Hong Kong is an internal

affair and foreign actors should not interfere (Geng, 2019). As usual, China shifted blame to
foreign forces for the various domestic uprising that China experiences. MOFA spokeswoman,
Hua Chunying (2019), consistently blames the US for sowing discord amongst Chinese groups
such as in Xinjiang, as well as trying to contain China’s growth (para. 5). For Hong Kong, state
media Xinhua, has several articles that blame the US for using the “Cold War mentality,”
fanning the flames of tension in Hong Kong (Xinhua, 2019, para. 3).
The Other Faces of Power in the Hong Kong Conflict
The above section has elaborated how China increased its integrative power while Hong
Kong was losing its own integrative power. However, it would be inadequate to discuss
Boulding’s (1990) Three Faces of Power without touching on the other two types of power that
exist through the presence of integrative power, and how these have an impact on the escalation
or de-escalation of conflict.
The first is the destructive power of the CCP that could also be exercised in Hong Kong.
That said, it is not in Beijing’s interest to rely purely on military might to bring Hong Kong to
submission. Therefore, the CCP limits it destructive power to threats. Under Boulding’s (1990)
definition, destructive power can also correspond to threat power in which there are several
patterns. If applied to the case of Hong Kong, the CCP must decide whether to carry out the
threat of punishing Hong Kong for its defiance against the party or not. This threat actually came
two years prior to the protests during President Xi’s visit to Hong Kong on Carrie Lam’s
inauguration. In 2017, President Xi said in Hong Kong that “any attempt to endanger China’s
sovereignty and security, challenge the power of the central government…is an act that crosses
the red line, and is absolutely impermissible” (Lau, 2017, para. 10). In an act of defiance,
HongKongers took to the streets to protest the pro-Beijing government’s extradition law. If
Beijing were to carry out its red-line threat, then it can even mean military intervention in Hong
Kong. The People’s Liberation Army’s Hong Kong garrison is amongst the most elite and
disciplined of PLA troops, and the fact that these soldiers have been seen on the streets of Hong
Kong after the protests indicates there is always a possibility of military intervention (Kuo,
2019b). If the CCP chooses not to carry out the threat, it either means that they do not have the
necessary destructive power, which is unlikely, or it can mean that the costs are too high to bear.
In the case of the Hong Kong protests, the latter seems to be true.

The cost of a military intervention, in other words the exercise of destructive power in
Hong Kong, would be too high for the CCP to bear. Economically, although Hong Kong today
only constitutes to 2.7% of China’s GDP, its world class financial and legal system gives people
overseas the confidence to invest (Sin, 2019). As such, the West such as the US treats Hong
Kong as a separate entity to China when it comes to trade and investments. This enables Hong
Kong to keep being China’s hub of foreign direct investments, a role that not even Shanghai can
replace. (Sin, 2019). Military intervention in Hong Kong would make investors lose confidence
in its formerly unique style of governance and legal system, likely to reduce Hong Kong to just
another port city of China. Thus, there is a low possibility of CCP threats being carried out even
with Beijing’s “red-line”.
There are two reasons for this, the first being that the situation today is unlike that of
1989. Back then, the Tiananmen Incident corresponded with the 1989 Poland legislative election
that would potentially allow Poland to appoint its first non-Communist prime minister and allow
opposition parties to sit together with their former oppressors for the first time since the Second
World War. Chinese leaders were unnerved that the Polish “disease” would eventually spread to
China protests in Tiananmen (Bartkowski, 2014, para 1). These elections were supposed to
happen on June 4, 1989, the day when the military crackdown happened at dawn in Tiananmen
Square.
The second reason is CCP fears backlash from international society if they were to
employ military crackdown on protests in Hong Kong. After the heavy criticisms of military
crackdown in Tiananmen, the CCP leadership has become much more aware of its international
image when handling “sensitive issues” such as the Hong Kong protests. In the past, China
responded to the Tiananmen criticisms by starting to contribute to international peace such as
participating UN peacekeeping operations, including joining the UN Transitional Authority to
Cambodia (UNTAC; He, 2019). Zheng Bijian’s (2005) call for China’s peaceful rise was to
reassure the world that China’s rise would be peaceful despite the mishaps in Tiananmen. Thus,
minus an event on the scale of the Polish legislative elections, it would be highly unlikely that
the CCP would jeopardize its fragile image on the international stage to shut down the Hong
Kong protests with robust military, destructive power. That said, the tension of conflict will be
maintained as long as democratic movements in Hong Kong continue and the CCP continues to
make threats.

Boulding’s (1990) productive power is also closely related to exchange power under the
economic power category. As shown above, although economic power is one of the pillars of
CCP legitimacy, it only constitutes a portion of Chinese nationalism and CCP legitimacy as
integrative power. That said, in some ways Hong Kong’s one country, two systems in itself is a
type of exchange power. The deal was to allow Hong Kong to remain autonomous with two
systems, but in exchange they would always be one country under China. For Boulding (1990),
productive power is the tools and machines that make things, but in relation to integrative power
it is also the power of people coming together to form legitimacy through organizations, groups
and families. Therefore, in this case, where the CCP is an inhibitor to HongKongers binding
together under the flag of one country, two systems, Hong Kong’s productive power is disrupted
by China. Economically, Hong Kong no longer has the value it did for China, compared to the
time of handover. In that case, the productive power that Hong Kong does hold is arguably the
ability to produce democracy for China, which the CCP is trying to prevent. Therefore,
productive power actually escalates conflict in the case of Hong Kong as the CCP does not allow
any other form of unity or legitimacy to be produced within its borders that would challenge its
one-party rule.
The CCP can use destructive power to make threats against Hong Kong, but it would be
unlikely that it would carry these threats out to protect its image on the international stage
without a major event in Hong Kong that would immediately pose a threat to their one-party
rule. However, as Hong Kong’s economic value diminishes for China, the remaining productive
power that Hong Kong carries for the CCP is the ability to create democracy under the Chinese
flag of one country. It would be unlikely that the CCP would value this productive power, and
instead, increase conflict to try to curb this.
Conclusion
At the time of writing, it has been 23 year since Hong Kong’s handover as a British
colony to China. At the time of the handover, former leader Deng Xiaoping promised 50 years of
unchanging autonomy from one country, two systems. Unfortunately, this autonomy has been at
a steady decay under the constant attacks on Hong Kong from the CCP, and we have barely
reached the 25-year halfway mark.
The peaceful rise of China was initially seen with skepticism, but regardless of whether
China’s rise can stay peaceful or not, it does not change the fact that China has successfully

transformed itself from one of the poorest countries in the world to the second largest economy
today. The hard military and economic might that the CCP accumulated under China’s rise is
now helping them create a powerful force of nationalism that becomes an integrative power that
China will use to punish its smaller domestic actors such as Hong Kong when in defiance. In
order to protect its fragile international image, the CCP does not usually exert this integrative
power, with the exception of CCP one-party rule under threat.
The path of Hong Kong was clear. With universal suffrage as a goal written in the Basic
Law, there was a succession of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong every year. The 2003
protests against the implementation of Article 23, the Umbrella Movement of 2014 calling for
more democracy and the 2019 protests against the extradition bill were of particular scale and
note. HongKongers become more threatened with each passing year about the CCP’s
encroachment on one country, two systems.
Although it is perfectly possible for the CCP to march the PLA into Hong Kong with
destructive power, they have shown restraint in employing destructive power in Hong Kong as
costs may be too high for the CCP’s rather fragile international image. Hong Kong has the
productive power to create a more democratic system under the Basic Law that would go against
the CCP’s one-party rule. This is a productive power that the CCP is actively trying to curb.
With the CCP’s skilled use of propaganda, China blames foreign forces such as the US of trying
to contain China’s growth and breaking the unity of the Chinese. This type of news sells and is
well received in China. The CCP have also denounced the protesters in Hong Kong calling them
thugs.
As a final remark, the author would like to recommend a path toward resolution of the
current Hong Kong conflict. As mentioned above, Carrie Lam has prevented the establishment of
an independent inquiry into the brutality of Hong Kong police during the 2019 protests. Lam’s
defense of police brutality has caused one of the biggest losses of Hong Kong integrative power
and she needs to hold the police accountable but has not done so. The victory of pro-democracy
candidates in 17 out of 18 districts in Hong Kong is a step forward for a more open and
transparent Hong Kong as it shows that public opinion has not turned against Hong Kong
democracy yet (McDonell, 2019). Still, the CCP is known to be uncompromising and
unforgiving against movements that challenge its one-party rule. Nationalism in China will
always be a force of integrative power that will be manipulated by the CCP’s propaganda

machine. Therefore, if there is to be any change in Hong Kong, it may well have to begin from
within China, instead.

References

2019-2020 Hong Kong protests timeline. (2020). Retrieved from
https://www.hrichina.org/en/2019-2020-hong-kong-protests-timeline

Albert, E. (2019). Democracy in Hong Kong. Retrieved from
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/democracy-hong-kong
Allison, G. (2017). Destined for war—Can America and China escape Thucydides’s trap?
Mariner Books.

Arendt, H. (1970). On Violence. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing.

Babones, S. (2019). The birth of Chinese nationalism. Retrieved from
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/03/the-birth-of-chinese-nationalism/

Bartkowski, M. (2014). From China to Poland, lessons from June 4, 1989. Retrieved from
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/from-china-to-poland-lessonsfrom-june-4-1989/

Baum, R. (1996). Burying Mao–Chinese politics in the age of Deng Xiaoping. Princeton
University Press.
BBC. (2019). Hong Kong protests: What is the ‘Umbrella Movement’? Retrieved from
https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/49862757

Blakemore, E. (2020) How a peaceful protest at Tiananmen Square turned into a massacre.
Retrieved from https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/history-andcivilisation/2020/06/how-a-peaceful-protest-at-tiananmen-square-turned-into-a-massacre

Boulding, K. E. (1990). Three faces of power: A general theory. Sage Publications, Inc.

Buckley, C. & Qin, A. (2019). Xi Praises a Student Protest in China. From 100 Years Ago.
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/world/asia/china-xi-jinpingspeech-may-4-protest.html

Bush, R. C. (2014). The roots of Hong Kong protest. Retrieved from
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/09/30/the-roots-of-hong-kong-protest/
Buzan, B. & Cox, M. (2013). China and the US: Comparable cases of ‘peaceful rise’? The
Chinese Journal of International Politics, 6, 109-132.

Callahan, W.A. (2004). National insecurities: Humiliation, salvation, and Chinese nationalism.
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 29(2).
https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540402900204

Chan, E. & Ko, S. (2019). Hong Kong chief executive Carrie Lam defends police use of force.
Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/19/asia/carrie-lam-hong-kong-policeforce-intl/index.html

Chen, J. (2007). Urbanization in China: A real challenge to soil protection and food security.
Catena, 69(1), 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.catena.2006.04.019

Chen, S. & Powell, J.L. (2012). Aging in China: Implications to social policy of a changing
economic state. Springer.

Chu, Y. (2013). Sources of regime legitimacy and the debate over the Chinese model. The
China Review, 13(1), 1-42. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23462227
Chung, K. (2017). Pan-democrats missed chance by not joining election race, Hong Kong’s

outgoing leader says. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/politics/article/2082844/pan-democrats-missed-chance-not-joining-election-racehong
Deng, X. (1984). Deng Xiaoping on “one country, two systems” (full text). Retrieved from
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-02/19/content_307590.htm

Dugan, M.A. (2003). Integrative power. Retrieved from
https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/integrative_power
Economy, E. (2013). The problem with Xi’s China model. Retrieved from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-03-06/problem-xis-china-model

Erzioni, A. (1975). A comparative analysis of complex organizations—on power, involvement,
and their correlates. Free Press.

Fu, H., Petersen, C.J., Young, S.N.M. (Eds.). (2005). National security and fundamental
freedoms: Hong Kong’s Article 23 under scrutiny. Hong Kong University Press.

Full texts of the Constitution and the Basic Law–chapter (4). (2017). Retrieved from
https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html
Garver, J.W., & Wang, F. (2010). China’s anti-encirclement struggle. Asian Security 6(3), 238261. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2010.507412
Geng, S. (2019). Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang’s regular press conference on
November 11, 2019. Retrieved from
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t171491
6.shtml

Gilpin, R. (1988). The theory of hegemonic war. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18(4),

591-613. https://doi.org/10.2307/204816

Haas, B. (2017). Hong Kong elections: Carrie Lam voted leader amid claims of China meddling,
Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/26/hong-kong-choosesnew-leader-amid-accusations-of-china-meddling

Hamilton, C.V., & Ture, K. (1992). Black power—The politics of liberation in America. Vintage
Books.
Hass, R. (2018). Trump’s focus on China trade: Right target, wrong approach. Retrieved from
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/06/14/trumps-focus-on-chinatrade-right-target-wrong-approach/

He, Y. (2018). China rising and its changing policy on UN Peacekeeping. In C. de Coning & M.
Peter (Eds.), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in a Changing Global Order (253276). Palgrave Macmillan.

Holbig, H. & Gilley, B. (2010). Reclaiming legitimacy in China. Politics and Policy 38(3), 395422. https://doi.org/10.111/j.1747-1346.2010.00241.x
Hua, C. (2019) Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying’s regular press conference on
December 3, 2019. Retreived from
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1721187.shtml
Ibrahim, Z. (2017). Chris Patten recalls ‘happiest years’ as last governor of Hong Kong…with
egg tarts, insults and a pirated memoir. Retrieved from
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2099806/chris-patten-recallshappiest-years-last-governor-hong-kong

Ieong, B. (2019). What drives Hong Kong police brutality against protesters? Freud may have

the answer. Retrieved from
https://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3039690/what-drives-hong-kong-policebrutality-against-protesters-freud-may

Ishihara seeking to buy Senkaku Islands. (2012). Retrieved from
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/04/18/national/ishihara-seeking-to-buysenkaku-islands/

Is tear gas in Hong Kong making polluted city a toxic turn? (2019). Retrieved from
https://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3038222/tear-gas-hong-kong-makingpolluted-city-take-toxic-turn

Jenkins, R., & Barbosa, A.F. (2012). Fear for manufacturing? China and the future of industry in
Brazil and Latin America. The China Quarterly 209, 59-81.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741011001482
Kuo, L. (2019a). Beijing’s new weapon to muffle Hong Kong protests: Fake news. Retrieved
from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/11/hong-kong-china-unrest-beijingmedia-response

Kuo, L. (2019b). Hong Kong: Protesters wary over elite troops clearing roadblocks. Retrieved
from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/18/hong-kong-protesters-wary-overelite-troops-clearing-roadblocks
Lahiri, T. (2019). A refresher course on Hong Kong’s 2014 umbrella movement.
Retrieved from https://qz.com/1714897/what-was-hong-kongs-umbrella-movementabout/

Lai, T.K. (2014). Occupy Central supporters should beware the risks of breaking the
law. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/comment/insightopinion/article/1530209/occupy-central-supporters-should-beware-risks-breaking-law

Lau, S. (2017). President Xi Jinping marks ‘red line’ in warning to Hong Kong on
national sovereignty. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/politics/article/2100895/president-xi-jinping-marks-red-line-warning-hong-kong

Lo, S. (2001). Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, communication and political
decay. Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Mao, Z-D. (1949). Selected works of Mao Tse-tung – The Chinese people have stood
up! Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selectedworks/volume-5/mswv5_01.htm
McCarthy, S. (2018). Are Hong Kong’s police Asia’s finest? A look at how the force
has evolved over decades. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/lawand-crime/article/2174735/are-hong-kong-police-asias-finest-look-how-force-has

McDonell, S. (2019). Hong Kong elections: Pro-democracy groups make big gains.
Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50531408

Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. W.W. Norton &
Company.

Opening session of 19th CPC National Congress. (2017). Retrieved
from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/18/c_136683471.htm

Pomfret, J. & Jim, C. (2019). Hong Kong Leader pulls extradition bill, but too little
too late, say some. Retrieved from
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests/hong-kong-leader-pullsextradition-bill-but-too-little-too-late-say-some-idUSKCN1VP05B

Purbick, M. (2019). A report of the 2019 Hong Kong protests. Asian Affairs 50(4), 465-478.

https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2019.1672397

Reid, D. (2020). Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam rejects independent inquiry into
police handling of protests. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/21/hongkongs-carrie-lam-rejects-independent-inquiry-into-police-tactics.html

Research on Article 23. (2013). Retrieved from
http://www.law.hku.hk/hrportal/basic-law/research-article-23

Scott, M. (1989). Hong Kong on borrowed time. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/22/magazine/hong-kong-on-borrowed-time.html

Shambaugh, D. (2013). China goes global: The partial power. Oxford University Press.

Shirk, S. (2007). China: Fragile superpower. Oxford University Press.

Sin, N. (2019). Explainer: How important is Hong Kong to the rest of China?
Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-marketsexplainer/explainer-how-important-is-hong-kong-to-the-rest-of-chinaidUSKCN1VP35H
Sun, N. (2019). Five things to know about Hong Kong’s extradition law. Retrieved from
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Hong-Kong-protests/Five-things-to-know-about-HongKong-s-extradition-law

Wintour, P. (2019). China threatening the autonomy of Hong Kong, says Chris Patten.
Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/21/china-threateningautonomy-of-hong-kong-says-chris-patten
Wong, T.S. (2019) Hong Kong protests: What are the ‘five demands’? What do protestors want?

Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/yp/discover/news/hongkong/article/3065950/hong-kong-protests-what-are-five-demands-what-do
Xinhua. (2018). Xi reaffirms China’s commitment to peaceful development path. Retrieved from
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/19/c_137479505.htm

Xinhua. (2019a). China condemns U.S. House approval of bill on Hong Kong.
Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/16/c_138475741.htm

Xinhua (2019b). Radical protestors strongly condemned for storming liason office of
central gov’t in Hong Kong. Retrieved from
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/22/c_138248532.htm

Xinhua. (2019c). Xi stresses enhanced studies of May Fourth Movement, spirit.
Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/20/c_137993875.htm
Zheng, B. (2005). China’s “peaceful rise” to great-power status. Retrieved from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2005-09-01/chinas-peaceful-rise-greatpower-status

